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Trusting Harvard: The Cost of Unprincipled Investing
This article provides a framework for answering two questions: How can Harvard fulfill its
fiduciary obligation as an investor in ways that advance its beliefs, values, and commitments?
How can Harvard take the lead in creating a curriculum for students, professionals, and the
general public about the civic moral obligations of wealth? While aimed at Harvard, the issues
covered are relevant to other universities and tax-exempt institutional investors, because they
have a special duty to advance the public interest. Commissioned and co-authored by the noted
corporate governance and responsible ownership guru Robert A. G. Monks, it calls on Harvard
to take a leadership role in recasting the meaning of “fiduciary” in the context of the scale and
power of institutional investors—particularly those with roots in civil society. “Myopic”
fiduciaries are short-term and narrowly focused, a paradigm that has held sway for decades.
“Ethical fiduciaries” are those that have made some effort to incorporate normative
considerations into their decision making, reflected in their investment policies and (typically)
proxy voting records. “Ethical, integrated fiduciaries” view their civic moral obligations as
investors in a more holistic way, across the portfolio and anchored in their institutional purpose.
______________________________________________________________________________

Part I: Letter to Harvard President Drew Faust
December 4, 2013
Dear President Drew Faust,
I have always been in love with Harvard. When I arrived for the first time by subway at Harvard
Square in September 1951 as a 17-year-old sophomore it felt very comfortable, as Harvard long
had been a precious ingredient in my karma. I stayed for twenty years, enjoying not only the
College but three of the graduate schools, the river, and all manner of Overseers’ visiting
committees. On leaving, we gave our house—nicely located next to the Cambridge Common—to
Harvard for the history department’s use.
By 1979, I was back in Boston and chairman of The Boston Company, a venerable trust
company with directors including Harvard’s Treasurer and the CEO of Harvard Management
Company. I have elsewhere described the mini-Epiphany that I experienced upon discovering
that a relatively few individuals in charge of fiduciary institutions held the controlling stock of a
preponderance of publicly listed companies. So it seemed sensible to write Derek Bok, the
hugely respected President of Harvard, to inquire as to the University’s position on its
responsibilities as owner of shares in the various companies held in its endowment.
Derek and I exchanged correspondence and lunches, and he later codified his general view:
As I have already observed, society respects the autonomy of academic
institutions because it assumed that they will devote themselves to the academic
tasks that they were established to pursue. This does not mean that the universities
should refrain from trying to influence the outside world. It does mean they
should exert an influence by fostering the reasoned expression of ideas and
Robert A. G. Monks and Marcy Murninghan, Trusting Harvard: The Cost of Unprincipled Investing (Miniver Press,
2014). Reprinted by permission of the authors and Miniver Press.
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argument put forward by their individual members and not by taking institutional
steps to inflict sanctions on others. Universities that violate this social compact do
so at their peril. They cannot expect to remain free from interference if they insist
on using their economic leverage in an effort to impose their own standards on the
behavior of other organizations.1
A fair-minded man, Derek acknowledged a different perspective:
[O]ne could argue that they should go further and initiate their own proposals for
other stockholders to consider. According to this view, ownership carries an
affirmative duty to try to improve the behavior of companies from which one
derives a profit. As a result, universities should acknowledge a responsibility to
exert such influence because they have the prestige to generate stockholder
interest and encourage company executives to pay close attention to the
resolution. . . .The burdens of initiating resolutions could be extremely heavy . . .
prohibitively expense for trustees to monitor the performance of all these
companies in order to initiate resolutions condemning inappropriate behavior. An
institution could also try to reduce the administrative burdens by agreeing to
sponsor resolutions only in certain categories of cases of unusual social
importance.2
As my fiftieth reunion approached, I thought it suitable to try once again to attempt to
correlate my own priorities with the realities of Harvard’s views. Hence, I wrote “To Harvard
with Love”3 and in 2003 delivered it personally to President Larry Summers who was then head
of the University and received me with grace—and some skepticism. Ultimately, he wrote, “I
intend to raise these issues in the appropriate forum.” Derek, to whom I also sent a copy, wrote:
“After wrestling with problems of this kind for twenty years, I must confess to feeling relieved
that I can relax and watch someone else grapple with them today. Shameful thought.”
Alas, Larry failed to achieve the support of the faculty and Derek was called upon once
again to be President of Harvard. He wrote in answer to my note of congratulations and
condolence: “it is ironic that having boasted of being free of responsibility for Harvard and its
problems, I find myself back in the hot seat.” He undertook to refer me to a Professor of Ethics at
the Harvard Business School but nothing came of it.
In January and June of 2013, I picked up my Presidential dialogue and wrote you about what
might by this time—my fifth decade and fourth Harvard President (counting Derek Bok twice—
politely or otherwise be styled the “Bob Monks Agenda.” In July, you replied with courtesy and
art: “I have taken the liberty of sharing your letter with colleagues involved with Harvard’s
investment, and I have asked that they be in touch with you directly if they are able to pursue
your offer [of help and money].”
In my letter of June 24, I had raised two questions:
1. How does Harvard define its responsibilities as owner of the various
securities held in the portfolio of its endowment?
2. Can Harvard take the lead in creating a curriculum to inform students and
the public of the “Ethics of Institutional Portfolio Ownership”?
2
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Having received no reply, I decided to celebrate my eightieth birthday by sending you my
own responses to these questions, along with a series of questions for university trustees to
consider. I've been ably assisted in this endeavor by Marcy Murninghan, alumna of Harvard
Graduate School of Education, former instructor in the Divinity School, and researcher at the
Kennedy School, who has concentrated on these issues since receiving her Harvard doctorate in
1983. We have long discussed and collaborated on these topics out of our mutual love for
Harvard.
With best wishes,
Robert A. G. Monks

Part II: Fiduciary Ethics
Of all the traditionally finessed contradictions in the position of great private universities
in America, none is greater than the stake in corporate capitalism by which they largely
finance themselves. . . . The assumptions implicit in Harvard's dependence on corporate
capitalism—without which it cannot survive-are intolerable unless it works actively to
bring the benefactor in line with the humanitarian attitude the University claims to
represent, and without which its survival is equally threatened.
—Michael Kinsley, “Profit without Honor”
Harvard Crimson, June 12, 1972
Restoring Fiduciary Values
The preceding quotation was written more than 42 years ago at a time when student activists
were challenging the moral implications of Harvard’s investment policy. What strikes me is that
what Michael Kinsley said then still applies today. He even pointed out the origins of the word
“divestiture.” In late 2013, one could republish his piece, edit it a bit, insert reference to
“divestiture of fossil fuel,” and submit it to the Wall Street Journal.
Kinsley’s article serves both as a critique and review of The Ethical Investor: Universities
and Corporate Responsibility, a landmark book delineating the obligations of universities, at the
very least, to avoid social injury through their investment policy.5 In doing so, Kinsley’s piece
points out the obvious: Harvard, along with universities in general, has a special obligation to
broaden, deepen, and connect its fiduciary obligations as an investor to its fiduciary obligations
as an academic institution. Who else can help transfer the human values of one generation to the
next, and beyond? Higher education looks to the future with insights gained from the past while
embracing change and transition and, as a result, it resembles Janus: two faces going in different
directions but possessing a coherent wholeness. To view investments as disconnected from this is
to undermine this wholeness, this integrity.
As Kinsley pointed out in 1972, Harvard has yet to assume a leadership role. That still is
true. In spite of decades of unrest and debate over its investments, Harvard has engaged in a
carefully choreographed dance of denial, in which all parties have acquiesced. In two significant
ways the discussion has remained fixed on certain features that fail to accomplish Harvard’s
avowed mission. First, discussion tends to concentrate on specific issues, rather than on longterm responsibility for critical problems facing us today. With great power and resources come
responsibility for engagement—something Harvard has not displayed.
Second, the discussion tends to concentrate on specific tactics—for example, to divest or not
to divest. To screen or not to screen. To boycott or not to boycott. Such a limited focus on issues
3
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and tactics misses the mark. I believe that Harvard needs to disclose some broader, and
substantive, beliefs, values, and commitments that inform multiple strategies and tactics—
covering both investment and academic operations. These beliefs, values, and commitments
constitute Harvard’s moral character as it has evolved nigh on four centuries, and can be
expected to evolve over centuries to come. They permeate everything it does.
In a changing world, responsibilities are not divided neatly into specific asset classes or
disciplines. A principles-based academic and investment policy equips graduates and
professionals with the flexibility and adaptive capabilities needed in a dynamic and volatile
environment. That’s the purpose of a liberal arts education.
Fiduciary Responsibility for Multiple Capitals
For forty years, the Harvard Management Company (HMC) has managed Harvard’s endowment
and related financial assets. That’s a departure from previous services provided by State Street
Boston Financial Corp., now State Street Corporation. I’m somewhat familiar with this history,
as I mentioned earlier. In the mid-70s I engaged directly with HMC’s CEO and Harvard’s
Treasurer, in my capacity as Chairman of The Boston Company. I’m well aware of the
considerable resources Harvard devotes to the management of its endowment. Harvard has been
the leader among universities in creating and funding a professional management capability for
its investments. It is important to continue this leadership by allocating resources to
understanding and implementing a more spacious concept of value. Looking at the University
and Harvard Management Company on a consolidated financial basis, the aggregate
compensation paid to manage the endowment is strikingly large when contrasted to the totals
paid for philosophy professors or, indeed, for the whole faculty of Arts and Sciences. My
concern is that endowment managers are being rewarded for behavior that does not accrue to
Harvard’s integrity.
The justification, of course, is that HMC works to generate the financial resources that
enable Harvard to do its work. Its publicly stated mission is clear: “Produce long-term
investment results to support the educational and research goals of the University.” The question
to ask is, What if the impacts of these investments undermine or contradict these educational and
research goals? Related to that is the assumption, now challenged by authoritative sources, that
the management of financial capital exists a world apart from human, environmental, social, built
environment (e.g., real estate, infrastructure), and intellectual capital (multiple or common
capitals). Of course, they do not. These other storehouses of energy affect performance, and
build upon earlier efforts to value intangibles.6
These days, multiple capitals theory is central to an evolving global sustainability ecosystem
that will powerfully impact capital markets. It’s the driving force in prominent corporate
accountability groups such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB),7 the
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC),8 the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)9, and
the Global Initiative for Sustainability Ratings (GISR).10 These groups recognize the materiality
of human, environmental, social, and other forms of capital to financial performance, and the
importance of sustainability disclosure to investors and stakeholders. 11 Thanks to activist
pressure, they’re also beginning to recognize the critical importance of planetary boundaries and
contextual factors affecting these “capitals.”12 Why? Because they’re a vital source of risk
management and value creation. And moral dilemmas and ethical considerations hover over all
of them.
Despite decades of discussion, often in response to some egregious controversy, there’s been
4
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little commitment of HMC resources to discovering how these other forms of capital and their
ethical implications bear upon value creation. It is this limited comprehension of what’s fitting,
proper, and possible that permits the perpetuation of stifling notions of fiduciary obligation,
notions that have become truncated over time.
And therein lies the rub: Harvard, like most universities and certainly most endowments,
clings to ideas about fiduciary duty that are frozen in time. Ironically, these ideas are relatively
young; they emerged during the past 60 years in response to a number of post-WWII
developments in the field of economics and social science that elevated algorithms über alles.
Such a devotion to mathematical models and so-called “rational behavior” fail to incorporate
systemic risks and how real people behave. They impede fair competitiveness and sustainable
prosperity, not to mention civic virtue.
These frozen ideas—I call it the plight of the myopic fiduciary—also fail to acknowledge
the ethical outcomes and impacts of investment decisions on human, natural, social, and other
forms of capital. These other capitals can generate true value for Harvard and its multiple
intergenerational communities, both current and future.
The myopic fiduciary fails to acknowledge the vastly different operating environment
affecting today’s capital markets and corporate management. Today’s marketplace is complex,
constantly changing, and increasingly disruptive, with barriers to entry continually falling.
There’s more sophisticated and organized advocacy from the investor community, business
coalitions, and nonprofit groups.13 And there’s increasing evidence to support the proposition
that managing risk to achieve positive financial performance is linked to managing material
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risk, too.
As David Blood and Al Gore wrote recently in the Wall Street Journal, that’s exactly what’s
happening with what they call the “subprime carbon asset bubble.” This means that institutional
investors such as Harvard are confusing “risk” with “uncertainty,” thus failing to incorporate it
into investment analyses. Investors need to identify total-portfolio carbon asset risk, say Blood
and Gore, and engage corporate boards and executives about their plans to mitigate and disclose
carbon risk. Otherwise investors are acting imprudently and exposing their portfolios to
“stranded assets”—that is, holdings that lose economic value well ahead of expectations.14
The myopic fiduciary fails to recognize that the current investment operating environment
features new business, reporting, and investor accountability frameworks, such as those
mentioned earlier. These new frameworks emphasize new models of materiality disclosure,
stakeholder engagement, and investor stewardship. In recent years, investors, corporate
managers, and policymakers have recognized the relevance of sustainability factors to
competitive performance. Throughout the world, sustainability initiatives have been launched,
laws have been passed, new regulations put in place, listing standards created,15 and financial
services developed. Prominent data providers and ratings agencies have factored ESG into their
offerings.16 Many foreign firms and funds invested here in the U.S. carry with them
sustainability commitments.
But Harvard remains an island unto itself—despite its world-class status and influence.
And, it trots out old arguments that no longer hold up. Those arguments remain covered with
the dust of earlier skirmishes over the last half century, musty with mold in the light of modern
developments.
Especially relevant here is the fact that, unlike most pension funds governed by actuarial
tables, university endowments have time on their side. Their duration is not constrained by
specific commitments. The Norwegian Government’s pension fund is an example of a long-term
5
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investor dedicated to sustainability practices in building wealth for future generations of
Norwegian people.17 The permanent investor brings a perspective to the corporate constellation
that is not available from other constituencies. Who else will require the enterprise to allocate
resources to planning and funding the post-carbon world? The myopic fiduciary is fixed on
short- term gains, rather than long term impacts. That’s a shame and a pity.
Becoming the Ethical and Integrated Fiduciary
Economics is an evolving art and science, not permanently fixed to this or that orthodoxy or
obstinate thinking. Therefore, Harvard can address critics of its investment policy by offering an
alternative fiduciary concept, one that’s tied to both theory and practice. I propose one that
recognizes that the scope of investment, ownership, and management responsibilities is broader
than mere profit maximization in producing lasting value. Such a model requires active
engagement, not passive acceptance, to counteract harmful conduct to people and the planet. It
draws upon new and increasingly mainstream thinking about how environmental, social, and
governance information is used in financial analysis to address sustainability factors posing risks
and opportunities. It views Harvard as a whole, not a disjointed institution with separate and
distinct moving parts, one part preaching cherished values, the other part undermining them in
the name of profit maximization.
That’s why, at a more general level, it also introduces ways in which Harvard as an investor
and an educational institution can cultivate those qualities of intellect, leadership, and public
spiritedness that helps usher in a better, more just economy. One that distributes benefits more
widely while reducing the costs of damaging impacts on society and the environment.
Indeed, the ethical and integrated fiduciary revives and strengthens the public interest
standard built into the Securities and Exchange Commission enabling legislation of 1933, 1934,
and 1940, wherein “the public interest” is mentioned 316 times, always linked to “investor
protection.”18
As such, both as an investor and an educational institution, Harvard can help to usher in a
more functioning democratic system of representative self-governance. That’s a system,
originally envisioned by the nation’s Founders, wherein power is distributed more widely, with
checks and balances in place to reduce the costs of damaging impacts upon community. The
ethical fiduciary views sustainability considerations and active shareholder engagement as a vital
extension of fiduciary duty, loyalty, and care. The integrated fiduciary views its responsibilities
as extending throughout the enterprise, consistent with its values and mission. Both are models
of stewardship that recognize the importance of business innovation, strategy, and multiple
capitals to value creation—financial, human, social, environmental, built environment, and
intellectual—that also impact the common good. Let’s call them “common capitals.” The ethical
fiduciary and the integrated fiduciary acknowledge the negative impacts of system risk and
externalities, and how they can be prevented. Both emphasize collaboration and knowledge
development so as to meet current challenges more effectively. And both acknowledge the need
to review the conflicts of interest that have popped up in the complex relationships throughout
the investment chain—conflicts of interest among intermediaries that are costly, in both
empirical and moral terms.
The Ethical Fiduciary: Loyalty as Voice
The problems presented by “the University as owner” go beyond that of a simple limited liability
6

New England Journal of Public Policy
shareholder because they are a fiduciary owner and owe loyalty to {chose one or more} today’s
students, yesterday’s students, contributors, faculty, tomorrow’s students, and the general public
(due to the IRS tax-exempt status of endowments).
We’re in the midst of massive transformation of our expectations of investor and corporate
governance and accountability, particularly affecting ESG performance. As these sustainability
concerns grow, prevailing assumptions about fiduciary obligation become challenged. The
myopic fiduciary cannot remain blind to digital technologies, the permeability of institutional
borders, conflicts of interest, more complex and innovative financial products, heightened
exposure to systemic risk, greater reliance on financial intermediaries, and the mismatch between
expectations—not to mention incentives—and performance.
The myopic fiduciary pays no attention to these changes, remaining aloof and assured that
performance goals will be met. That’s a form of blind faith that has little bearing on the
marketplace, corruption and abuses of power, or evolving interpretations of law in response to
changing circumstances.
The myopic fiduciary is imprudent, impervious to the dynamic nature of fiduciary principles
and duties.
The ethical fiduciary, in contrast, recognizes its obligation to oversee activities entrusted to
its care—including the outcomes and impacts of those activities—so as to uphold the highest
standards of ethics and values. The ethical fiduciary recognizes the continuing evolution of this
obligation, as circumstances warrant; the past several decades are testament to this. The ethical
fiduciary assures that all of those associated with managing an endowment—including financial
advisers, investment managers, administrators, trustees, and investment committee members—
understand, accept, and act upon their obligations as owners and investors.
While mindful of the need to generate financial returns, the ethical fiduciary recognizes that,
beyond “the legality of the corporation’s activities where they are performed as the sole criterion
of eligibility for investment . . . it cannot close its eyes to the moral factors.” That’s what faculty
members of the 1971 Harvard Committee on University Relations with Business Enterprise
concluded in the so-called “Austin Report,” referring to issues related to public health, apartheid
South Africa, and the concept (promoted by the work at the Business and Law School, as well as
Economics faculty in Arts and Science) of “corporate souls.”19
The ethical fiduciary harmonizes the civic moral values governing its institutional mission
with the civic moral values governing its endowment. It does so through policy, procedures, and
structures that assure this harmony won’t diminish over time.
Terms of Engagement
This kind of harmony, extended to investments, is not a new idea. Throughout the past 40 years
Harvard has sought to deal constructively with pressures to consider social issues in its
investment portfolio. From 1970s-era Campaign GM and South Africa-related portfolio
investments, to current debates over human rights and environmental protection, Harvard has
recognized the importance of environmental, social, and governance considerations. More
recently, the Social Choice option and creation of a Vice President for Sustainability at HMC
suggest greater embrace of the financial implications of heretofore nonfinancial indicators.
As President Faust indicated in her response to fossil fuel investments, she favors
engagement over divestment, and recognizes the importance of disclosing ESG factors in
determining investment risk and opportunity.20 The appointment of Jameela Pedicini as Vice
President for Sustainability at HMC contributes to this, helping Harvard to forge a future
7
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achieving “superior investment returns as it fulfills a university’s distinctive responsibilities to
society.” That, in addition to the emergence of worldwide trends toward greater investor
engagement and a global architecture supporting corporate ESG disclosure and responsible
stewardship, puts Harvard in an irresistible position to take the lead. After all, who better to
encourage corporate responsibility and sustainability than the owners who benefit (or not) from
their decisions?
A diminished sense of the purpose and means of the fiduciary obligation lies at the heart of
our current nationwide crisis, threatening not only our democratic society but contradicting the
very values that Harvard holds dear. Over recent decades, due to a variety of social and
organizational forces, the classic fiduciary pillars of duty, loyalty, and care have become reduced
to algorithmic calculations and a paper chase for “Alpha” that possess no moral depth or
recognition of complexity.
The Integrated Fiduciary: A Holistic Approach
I have argued that, as Harvard’s endowment has grown, so, too, has its obligation as an ethical
fiduciary—particularly manifest through shareholder responsibility and active engagement. To
view conceptually the fiduciary obligation as separate from university purpose and mission
bifurcates the very mission Harvard purports to advance: Veritas in aspiration and action.
That’s a shame, because a house divided against itself cannot stand—especially when that
“house” is as prominent as Harvard University, and a vital part of an influential network of
institutions that constitute the world as we know it. There is no such thing as perfect freedom or
autonomy: Harvard is a deeply embedded institution in social, political, economic, cultural, and
natural systems that nourish and sustain it—just as it seeks to nourish and sustain these systems.
Its actions in one sphere have consequences in others, in all that it does, including its
investments.
I propose that in addition to acting as an ethical fiduciary, Harvard behave as an integrated
fiduciary. What does that mean? It means extending the values that animate program decisionmaking on the academic side to investment decision making on the endowment side, across the
portfolio. Climate risk, for example, is not something that affects only corporations; it also
affects other asset classes. So, too, do risks associated with political conflicts, ethical lapses,
human rights violations, excessive compensation and fees, and other concerns that shareholders
have about effective corporate governance and performance. There is important work occurring
along these lines, something that needs to be more fully incorporated into both HMC’s
operations, as well as the Harvard curriculum. While my focus is on publicly traded securities, an
integrated fiduciary ethic views the entire portfolio as an extension of institutional values,
something fitting and proper within current interpretations of fiduciary obligation.

Part III: Harvard’s Role: Curricular Options for the Ethical, Integrated
Fiduciary
Happiness is the exercise of vital powers along lines of excellence in a life affording
them scope.
—Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
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Fiduciary Integrity and the University as Educator
One of the byproducts of the university acting as an ethical, integrated fiduciary is improved
economic accountability and performance. Another is an active and engaged citizenry. Both are
essential qualities for a healthy representative democracy. That’s the opportunity before the
members of the Harvard Management Corporation, and we the legion of benefactors who wish to
sustain Harvard in the present and the future.
The university is a special kind of investor, unlike pension funds or mutual funds or banks or
insurance companies. That’s because it’s granted a charter to advance, somehow, both private
character and the public interest. The university as an ethical, integrated fiduciary emphasizes
throughout its educational mission the ideas and values of responsible stewardship. Affecting
multiple/common capitals, that kind of stewardship is directed to a future of sustainable
prosperity. It balances quantity with quality, and recognizes that behind the numbers lie
important questions of purpose and civic virtue.
Through its research, teaching, and outreach, Harvard is in a position to profoundly
influence current and future generations of leaders, in addition to professionals, policymakers,
and the public. It can do this through a carefully considered curriculum of fiduciary obligation,
or “civic stewardship.” Such a curriculum comprises a range of topics and disciplines, both deep
and wide. It would draw on the extraordinary array of existing activity, from FAS through the
various graduate schools. It also would feature new activity, geared specifically to institutional
investor responsibilities for active equity ownership, and broader public participation.
Such a curriculum would feature a collaborative, forward-looking process with increasingly
complex levels, rooted in both theoretical concepts but also practice. It would involve
participants playing the ethical fiduciary game in ways that inspire curiosity, empowerment,
challenge, and teamwork—all linked to improving performance and understanding of the value
creation process, both internal and external to the firm and/or portfolio. It's an approach that
would generate deep, not superficial, learning, and have direct bearing on professional
performance and understanding. It would represent a form of ongoing education, rooted in solid
pedagogy and incorporating various learning theories, so that subject matter and technology can
be brought together in ways that illuminate, engage, and empower.
It also would make great use of digital tools and the latest insights into the use of
educational technology for networked learning environments. Indeed, EdX, Harvard’s Berkman
Center, and expertise at the Graduate School of Education’s Technology, Innovation, and
Education (TIE) Program offer important insights and resources.
Here’s a thumbnail sketch of key characteristics and questions, organized along a
progressive continuum of intellectual and applied knowledge.
Level I: Fiduciary Fundamentals
This introductory part of the curriculum would introduce the essentials, including sustainability,
value creation, and corporate and investor accountability. From a pedagogical perspective, it
relies on remembering and understanding the fundamentals of historic, current, and evolving
definitions of fiduciary obligation, applied to investors, corporate officials, policymakers, and the
public.
Offered through any of the faculties of FAS, the Law School, Business School, Kennedy
School, Ed School, even the Divinity School, it would address the fundamentals of capital
markets and corporate ownership. Sample topics might include questions regarding the
interrelated categories of context, character, conduct, and consequences. For example:
9
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CONTEXT
How private is private?
How has the power and influence of the transnational corporation impacted the quality
of life of world civilization, transcending traditional geo-political structures and
boundaries and shaping a society's cultural values as well as foreign policy?
What characterizes current corporate and capital market activity regarding sustainable
prosperity? How has it changed and how will it evolve?
What characterizes emerging global infrastructure supporting new and broader
understanding of a fiduciary ethic affecting both quantitative and qualitative
dimensions?
What are the key substantive issues related to measuring sustainability impact within a
context of planetary boundaries, climate change, and political uncertainty?
What do religious, humanist, and philosophical traditions have to offer us about ethics
and the civic moral obligations of wealth?
What contributions are social scientists making toward our understanding of markets,
manners, and mores?
What are biologists and neuroscientists discovering about how we humans make moral
judgment?
What horizon issues affect markets and morals?
CHARACTER
What does it means to be a trustee?
What are the qualities of character, organizational behavior, and structure for good
governance, ownership, management, and accountability?
Who are the key players, direct and intermediary, across the value chain?
What are the types, roles, and responsibilities of institutional investors?
What are the special fiduciary obligations of endowments (nonprofit investors)?
What new environmental, social, and governance expectations confront corporations
and other forms of private enterprise?
What are the barriers to civic virtue, and how can they be surmounted?
CONDUCT
How is responsible ownership or stewardship defined, and what models exist for its
execution?
How has the evolution, experience, and insights of shareholder engagement bolstered
collective action to a greater good?
What laws and reporting requirements affect them?
What voluntary actions might institutional investors and corporations take to achieve
sustainable prosperity and political transparency?

10
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CONSEQUENCES
How do these actions strengthen our political economy and representative democracy?
Level II: Fiduciary Usable Knowledge
This is the intermediate part of the curriculum; it builds upon Level I: Fiduciary Fundamentals
and puts them to work in real or hypothetical settings. From a pedagogical perspective, it
analyzes and applies them to firm-based or industry-based or issue-based situations, and/or those
affecting geographical regions and place-based problems. It calls for integrated thinking across
sectors, disciplines, and geographic boundaries. It is mindful of behavior, culture, and changing
conditions.
Again, faculty and staff resources from the FAS, Graduate Schools, and other academic and
applied initiatives can be drawn upon to help address critical questions about specific
circumstance, context, and impacts involving multiple / common capitals, capital markets, and
corporate enterprise. External collaborative partners can make important contributions, too.
Pertinent questions relate to substance, strategy, and structure:
SUBSTANCE
What sources of knowledge and expertise apply to the substantive issues, problems,
risks, and opportunities presented by multiple or common capitals and the public
interest?
Beyond the moral minimum, what ethical principles, codes, or systems are appropriate
for current market and intermediary agents?
How do the ethical values of various religious and philosophical traditions become
integrated in professional and public life—including trusteeship and investment
management?
How do you maintain integrity when these ideals and practices are challenged by
market pressures and political influence?
How do you carry out responsible ownership and engagement in a pluralist society and
diverse regulatory environment?
How do you provide for continued learning, adjustment, and adaptability, given market
uncertainties, emerging issues and trends, and core values of democratic accountability,
sustainability, and civic virtue?
STRATEGY
How do you balance bottom line financial pressures with a commitment to do good in
the world?
How do you factor climate risk and multiple or common capital theory into corporate
and portfolio decision-making?
What strategic alternatives in addition to or in lieu of divestiture might forcefully and
constructively address climate change and other major ESG problems?
How can we measure, manage, and monitor the impacts of our investments on the
existing stock and flow of multiple or common capitals?
11
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STRUCTURE
What similar measuring, managing, and monitoring mechanisms can be installed to
assure flexibility and adaptability when confronting ESG risk?
What mechanisms can we build for transparency, monitoring, and adaptive learning—
given the dynamic nature of fiduciary obligation and circumstances?
How can wider and purposeful stakeholder engagement be developed?

Level III: Fiduciary of the Future
This third, advanced part of the curriculum is future-focused. Building upon Level I and Level
II, it dives into trends, forecasting, and calculations about horizon issues that could impact both
the operating environment and the public interest. Pedagogically, it’s a process of sustained
inquiry, reflection, and innovation that relies on evaluating and creating, a form of design
thinking and doing. This is emerging, frontier knowledge that means staying on the learning
edge, spanning boundaries, and looking ahead to ESG issues that are likely to emerge, along with
other macro-forces at work.
It draws on the work of Harvard faculty and other resources throughout the institution. It
also works with non-Harvard groups and individuals who catalyze systemic change to exploit
sustainability opportunities, mitigate negative impacts, and build resilience. Some of the rich
challenges facing the Fiduciary of the Future include testing and scaling solutions aimed at:
Multifaceted disruptions occurring as a result of natural disasters and pandemics;
Reversing growing economic disparities between the have and have-nots;
Combatting corruption and developing ethical performance cultures;
Creating more entry points for citizenry to take charge of their economic (and political)
destiny;
Preparing for demographic, political, and environmental shifts;
Building intergenerational support;
Anticipating—or creating—changes in the reporting, accountability, legal, and
regulatory environments;
Managing the proliferation of digital media and other technological innovations; and
Understanding the ethical implications of biomedical and scientific breakthroughs.
Of course, Harvard already has a bountiful array of courses scattered throughout the
university that touch upon these questions. Virtually every School and many Centers bring
something to the sustainability table, and in some cases offer dedicated programs. Yet as
impressive as this is, the fiduciary dimension is missing, along with a sophisticated moral
discourse on how markets should incorporate human values.
So I ask: How might Harvard mobilize Veritas across a large canvas, in the pursuit,
advancement, and diffusion of learning about how best to steward various forms of capital?
How might Harvard deploy its vast array of resources in service to cultivating future and
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current wise, sagacious, and thoughtful leaders, many who will find themselves as board
directors and trustees?
The appendix contains a series of questions for university trustees to ponder. For current and
future students, there are many ways of tackling these questions, from empirical and normative
perspectives. They range from special courses or modules, to interfaculty collaborations and
research initiatives. Applied to practitioners, the Kennedy School’s “Executive Session” model is
well-suited to such an inquiry. An Executive Session involves practitioners and academics in a
shared quest to develop “usable knowledge” on emerging critical public issues.
Relying on blended model of online and face-to-face engagement, it’s increasingly “owned”
by participants.21 Certainly other forms of blended approaches, utilizing massive open online
courses (MOOCs) and other digital approaches, are appropriate.
Critical here is to involve staff at Harvard Management Corporation, too, in a powerful
demonstration of “integrated thinking.”
Fiduciary Thinking is High-Level Knowledge, Cognition, and Social Competence
A Harvard education aspires to more than filling students’ heads with facts and figures. At both
the undergraduate and graduate levels, as well as through the Extension School and various
public offerings, Harvard also seeks to equip students with the flexibility and adaptive
capabilities needed in a volatile environment. This means offering an education where problems
cannot be broken down into separate disciplines or fields of analysis. It means fostering
expansion and growth through increasing knowledge and ongoing, expanding performance
capabilities. It means helping smart people learn how to learn, as the recently deceased Harvard
Business School professor and “father” or organizational learning Chris Argyris put it.22
Harvard University is perfectly suited to developing high level fiduciary knowledge,
cognition, and social competence. The question is, How might Harvard go about this? If not
Harvard, then who?
Veritas, Self-Governance, and the Public Interest
I realize this may raise red flags if people perceive this as impinging on academic freedom. That
is not my intent. My point is that, with its vast and varied resources, Harvard is unique. It can
mobilize existing teaching, research, and outreach activities to better equip students and
professionals for discharging their civic and fiduciary/stewardship responsibilities, through wise
and active engagement. That’s consistent with its mission as a university. As an institution,
Harvard, as with other research universities, has an overwhelming duty to the pursuit of Veritas
and the public interest. That’s a duty that overrides every other possible interest—including the
self-interest of specific groups, such as lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers.23
The argument for active engagement, manifest through equity ownership, occurs within two
frames. The first is the current global context of best practices and efforts. Spanning the past
several decades, they’ve elevated corporate ownership and value creation to a higher plane. The
second involves the responsibilities of informed and active citizenship if we are to maintain our
republican form of self-governance in public life.
This self-governance piece is relevant to academe. Universities are places where the
tradition of shared governance continues, despite criticisms that it often leads to gridlock. To be
sure, as Derek Bok points out, university governance leaves a lot to be desired.24 Differences
exist between the formal decision making power and influence of principal actors (e.g., trustees,
academic leaders, faculty, and students) and actual practice. They resemble the differences found
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in corporate governance among shareholders, boards of directors, and management. Information
asymmetries also exist, which can lead to unfortunate results.
Yet faculty and administrators are expected to play a major role in university governance,
bringing their knowledge and perspectives to bear upon a range of important issues. While not
necessarily efficient (no one ever claims academic decision making is efficient!), shared
participation in university governance exhibits many of the qualities expected of good
governance in business and public life. They include:
Shared commitment to purpose;
Shared commitment to ethical values;
A climate of mutual trust;
Careful attention to a collaborative and respectful process of education (especially
when it involves new developments affecting institutional mission) and engagement;
Free, candid, open, and informed debate, in a variety of venues, both formal and
informal;
Willingness to change course, even fail, based on due diligence and critical feedback.
“To govern is to foresee,” a 19th century French president once said.25 Self- governance
within a republican tradition of representative democracy demands a rootedness in the present
and knowledge of history. It also calls for “sentinelship,” enabling future gazing, reflection, and
consultation with experts to identify emerging issues and their implications for policy, program,
and practice. That’s Level III, a Fiduciary for the Future, and that’s what Harvard can help to
cultivate.
The Business of Neutrality: Beyond the Moral Minimum
Over the years much has been written about the importance of university neutrality in order to
maintain academic freedom. On October 3, Harvard President Drew Faust issued a “Fossil Fuel
Divestment Statement,” writing about the importance of the endowment in meeting academic
aims, rather than serving “other purposes, however worthy.”26 She warned against
“instrumentalizing” the endowment, claiming that this “can entail serious risks to the academic
enterprise. The endowment is a resource, not an instrument to impel social or political change.”
Blended Relationships and Value27
While it’s true that academic values are to be cherished and maintained, the idea that universities
are neutral doesn’t square with current reality. Nor does the notion that Harvard remains aloof
from exerting economic pressure for social purposes. The fact is, there is a great deal of comingling between Harvard’s role as an investor and Harvard’s role as a research and teaching
institution. Harvard is an active participant in the economic and political life of many industries
and sectors, within the United States and throughout the world. As a result, Harvard becomes
subject to various accountability regimes affecting sustainability, quality of life, and intellectual
property, among other performance areas.
As an institutional investor, Harvard’s also subject to, as I’ve pointed out, the emerging
global infrastructure regarding responsible ownership, transparency, and disclosure—in
particular, the movement toward integrated reporting. Then we must ask, What are the principles
and guiding lights that govern both the endowment and academic sides? How might Harvard
take the lead as an ethical, integrated fiduciary, equipping its students, faculty, and staff—even
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its alumni and others who choose to become engaged—with knowledge and competence that
enable them to carry this stewardship model forward?
Along with many other universities, as Harvard has grown larger and more complicated, it
has cultivated all kinds of research relationships with business, government, foundations, and
individual donors. In many cases, these are for commercial and political purposes. The lines
between basic and applied research are blurred as research becomes more collaborative and
interdisciplinary. Be it the natural or social sciences, business, education, law, medicine, or the
arts, the problems of society become the canvas on which academic resources are brought to
bear. This typically involves many investigative partners, who are excited by opportunities for
cross-disciplinary, cross-sector collaboration. Projects are undertaken not only on the basis of
their intellectual merits, but for what they offer in terms of practical consequences.
Commenting on this development, Derek Bok writes, “The ‘ivory tower’ has been breached
at so many points and the connections with the outside world have grown so numerous and close
that the term no longer has descriptive value. The very mission of research universities has
expanded to include making contributions to economic development and other national needs,
with consequences for science that are not fully understood.”28
These “contributions to economic development and other national needs” also are the
province of institutional investors, who face challenges associated with climate risk, corporate
political activity, corporate governance, energy options, political instability, human rights,
supply chain vulnerability, privacy protection, and so on. Harvard also tackles many of these
same questions, in various initiatives scattered throughout the university.
Why not make these efforts more transparent? Indeed, most people are unaware of the
breadth and depth of Harvard’s work in areas that matter to institutional investors, who often
lack sound information with which to make informed decisions.
Donor Expectations
Another challenge to the neutrality argument is the fact that faculty and researchers often “take
the preferences and predilections of funders into account if they need money to carry out a
project,” as Bok points out. “Investigators whose careers depend on getting grants for their
research may feel constrained to choose safe problems to pursue in order not to risk being turned
down by funding agencies.”
Other pressures on academic freedom, he says, include “fear of intense student disapproval
[that] doubtless encourages some professors from taking up some controversial subjects in
class,” the challenges to scholarship posed by obtaining research funding, and the appointments
process in departments that are “wedded to a particular ideology or way of approaching the
subject matter in its field.”29 There are many forces in play that contribute to bias, thus affecting
what research questions are pursued and the type of research methods employed.
While there is nothing inherently wrong with these relationships, as long as they don’t
undermine core academic values, they do pose ongoing risks to institutional integrity. Yet an oftheard response to pressures to integrate moral concerns into the university’s fiduciary obligation
is that potential donors might be put off by what they perceive as indictments of their behavior.
“Don’t bite the hand” becomes a defense against any form of protest against vexing problems. At
its worst, this position, in the name of neutrality, represents an insidious form of apathy and
passivity. It’s a backhanded endorsement of the status quo, despite evidence that suggests the
status quo isn’t working.
At best, neutrality sometimes gets linked to a “moral minimum” of doing no harm. That was
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the position taken by the authors of The Ethical Investor in 1972, at a time when universities
were riven by social and political conflict. (According to Michael Kinsley, during that time
students demanded that Harvard sell its Gulf stock as a protest against Portuguese colonialism,
they occupied Massachusetts Hall for a week.30)
One outcome of a liberal education is to question the status quo and conventional wisdom,
even advocate for reform. To expect that the day-to-day life of Harvard should somehow follow
a different set of rules than the day-to-day life of Harvard’s investments is to succumb to the
argument that “tainted money ’t’ain’t enough”—that it cedes its power to reform corporations, or
financial system, in the name of an illusory goal.
The University’s Role
That capitalists often conspire to break the law—or stand by to let it be broken—is no surprise.
Most recently, in The Bully Pulpit, Doris Kearns Goodwin describes the early efforts of
investigative journalists to expose the nefarious links between business and government. It
sounds like today, but Kearns Goodwin is talking about the turn of the twentieth century. Writing
for McClure’s Magazine, the muckrakers confronted the corruption that had infected American
politics and business, and galvanized an American public in doing so. McClure’s January 1903
editorial could well have been written today, setting forth the challenge:
Capitalists, working men, politicians, citizens—all breaking the law, or letting it
be broken. Who is left to uphold it? The lawyers? Some of the best lawyers in this
country are hired, not to go to court to defend cases, but to advise corporations
and business firms how they can get around the law without too great a risk of
punishment. The judges? Too many of them so respect the laws for some “error”
or quibble that they restore to office and to liberty men convicted on evidence
overwhelmingly convincing to common sense. The churches? We know of one,
an ancient and wealthy establishment, which was compelled by a Tammany holdover health officer to put its tenements in sanitary condition. The colleges? They
do not understand.
There is no one left; none but all of us.31
Well, it’s time for the colleges to understand. And it’s up to all of us to make this happen.
How? One of the ways of addressing corruption in capital markets is to do a better job of
preparing young people for professional and public life, to teach them about how capital markets
work, about how malleable they are.
Another is to help reorient and support existing professionals to uphold high standards of
conduct in professional and public life, especially within the realms of finance and investing.
“Out-of-integrity behavior has become institutionalized,” Michael C. Jensen, Harvard
Business School professor emeritus, recently told a group of Montreal business school students.
“It’s so pervasive, it seems to be business-as-usual, or the nature of finance.”32 In addition to his
pioneering work in corporate finance, Jensen also is co-founder, chairman, and “chief integrity
officer” of the Social Sciences Research Group (SSRN).33 Jensen is keenly interested in
exploring positive role of values in economics and the social sciences, and how they affect
outcomes.34
“About two-thirds of what we do in the MBA program is false, in terms of preparing for
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moral leadership,” he said. “It's astounding the amount of lying that goes on in every financial
report. We in business schools are responsible for that.”
This happens, he continued, because “most people fail to see the cost in violating integrity.
They systematically sacrifice integrity due to the integrity-performance paradox. There’s a veil
of invisibility over their sense of self-perception.”
It seems to me that the purpose of education is to lift those veils of invisibility so that there
greater congruence between words and deeds. The role and influence of the great research
university has changed over time, but its core mission as a “city of intellect and public service”
remains intact. Harvard cannot be a house divided, wherein the fiduciary responsibilities for its
investments reside in one wing, its educational responsibilities in another.
The same challenge exists with other tax-exempt institutions fortunate and wealthy enough
to have investment portfolios. Their fiduciary obligation extends from their social compact and
charter, granted by the State as a condition of tax-exemption. The unique obligation of
universities-as-investors, as well as other kinds of endowments, is to assure consistency between
the civic moral values governing program governance, operations, and impact, and those
affecting investment governance, operations, and impact.
The three-part curriculum proposed in this document presents some substantive building
blocks to fiduciary integrity (coda for shareholders, fiduciary ownership, and citizenship), and
the role Harvard can play in educating those multiple actors who contribute to fulfilling it.
A fiduciary ethic suitable for twenty-first century realities draws from multiple disciplines,
helping to build a scope of vision informed by learned thought. It does not confine
environmental, social, and governance issues into a single bucket. It views them as vital parts of
all forms of asset management, subject to the fiduciary standard.
A twenty-first century fiduciary ethic calls for a form of ownership and trusteeship better
equipped to deal with the problems we now face. To paraphrase a distinguished twentieth
century lawyer, politician, and statesman, it calls for synthesizing the fruits of scattered
capacities so that our problems may be looked at as a whole, rather than subject to sporadic
treatment from various but limited points of view.35
I have offered a series of suggestions as to how this notion of stewardship can be woven into
a three-level curriculum, ranging from basic knowledge to future problem-solving. Such a
curriculum draws upon Harvard’s rich array of resources, connecting current scattered capacities
into a textured whole. It also involves external parties and partnerships, working in these fields.
It’s time for Harvard to grab the opportunity and take a leadership role. The immediate aim:
Enhance the knowledge and competence of current and future generations of fiduciaries,
especially owners of publicly traded equities. The larger aim: recapture the essence of citizenship
and democracy, with its tradition of participation, accountability, and representation, suitable to a
twenty-first century context.
More specifically, I’ve touched upon what Harvard can do in the realms of program,
process, and partnerships when confronting questions related to ethics, economics, engagement,
and multiple/common capitals. That’s because these are lenses through which the fiduciary
obligation can be understood.
Throughout, I have maintained that the goals of sustainable capitalism—articulated by
many, but most persuasively by Al Gore and David Blood’s Generation Management LLP, in its
February 2012 white paper, Sustainable Capitalism36—can be achieved through learned,
competent, and motivated investors. It is they who hold corporate boards and management
accountable for long-term wealth creation, thereby reducing agency costs and damaging
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externalities.

Appendix
The Ethical, Integrated Fiduciary
Ten+ Questions for University Trustees to Consider37
1. What beliefs, values, and commitments govern our investment policy, and how
well is it communicated? Are they it written and available in plain and
understandable language so that university constituents, taxpayers, and the
broader public can understand them?
2. What are the consistencies and inconsistencies between our investment policy and
the guiding beliefs, values, and commitments—e.g., the pursuit, advancement, and
diffusion of learning—of our university? How does university purpose inform
how best to steward various forms of capital—financial, human, environmental,
social, built environment?
3. How are these investment values, beliefs, and commitments communicated with
investment chain intermediaries—such as collective investment vehicles, agents,
service providers, and custodians—where such intermediaries exist?
4. How might we be more intelligently and actively engaged as a responsible owner
of portfolio companies, both separately and with others? What policies,
guidelines, practices, and tools are we using to monitor the behavior of our equity
holdings, to assess circumstances, performance, and long-term value? How are
our policies, guidelines, and practices publicly communicated and understood?
What provisions do we have for communicating with the public and eliciting
feedback on our approach?
5. What policy, guidelines, and voting record do we have for due consideration of
proxy resolutions on environment, social, and governance matters? How are they
publicly communicated and understood? What provisions do we have for
modifying them, in response to changing circumstances and feedback?
6. What substantive knowledge, resources, and support do we need to fulfill our
fiduciary commitments? What internal expertise do we possess—research,
teaching, outreach—regarding the issues, problems, risk, and opportunities
presented by investment decision-making, multiple or common capitals, and the
public interest? What internal and external partnerships, collaborations, and
information do we need?
7. In addition to public equities, what are the science- or evidence-based impacts of
our institution’s investments, across the portfolio, on the existing stock and flow
of multiple or common capitals? How are these impacts measured, managed,
monitored, and reported to university constituents and the wider community?
8. How do we intend to engage our constituents (both on and off campus), peers,

and the public in conversations about this broader definition of fiduciary
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obligation—e.g., the ethical, integrated fiduciary—in an interdependent world?
What is our policy and practice regarding public engagement in relevant policy
dialogue on investment matters affecting University constituents and the wider
community? What mechanisms or feedback loops do we have for incorporating
the fruits of these discussions into our policy and practice?
9. What mechanisms do we have for transparency, monitoring, and adaptive

learning given the dynamic nature of fiduciary obligation and circumstances?
What provisions do we have for early detection of possible breach of fiduciary
duty claims?
10. How might our university deploy its vast array of resources in service to
cultivating future and current wise, sagacious, and thoughtful leaders, many who
will find themselves as board directors and trustees?
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